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Criminalising LGBT persons under national criminal 
law and Article 7(1)(h) and (3) of the ICC Statute  
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Chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law, Durham University 
 
 
 
 
 
The Elephant in the Room 
 
 
International criminal justice has a problem with the protection of sexual orientation. During 
the negotiations around the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Statute (ICCS) there was a 
fierce debate about the use and definition of the term “gender”, with a sizeable number of 
states opposing the use of the term as a synonym for sexual orientation, which could have 
included lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
1
 persons (LGBT)
2
. Art. 7(3) ICCS finally was 
given the following wording: 
 
For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" refers to the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from 
the above. 
 
The phrase “within the context of society” could lead one to think that it may have left the 
door open for the Court to slip sexual orientation
3
 in through the backdoor when interpreting 
the Statute; however, it appears that this phrase was more a of a fig-leaf to broker a textual 
compromise between the two camps, and that it was the intention of the drafters that sexual 
orientation was excluded as a component of the term gender in Art. 7(3) ICCS
4
, despite the 
fact that previous international practice had already adopted a wider interpretation of the 
term
5
. Some have argued that the wording is sufficiently flexible to allow the ICC to interpret 
it in order to encompass sexual orientation, or that one might use the residual category of Art. 
7(1)(h) ICCS, i.e. 
 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law
6
. 
 
The wording of Art. 7(1)(h) and 7(3) ICCS has been adopted unchanged in the recent 2010 
Draft Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, not without some criticism
7
.  
 
This paper is going to argue that the drafting compromise was ultimately an exercise in moral 
failure for the sake of the political feasibility, cementing one of the most glaring instances of 
discrimination, and that it is high time to correct that error, especially in the context of the 
rising tide of state-sponsored homophobia that can be noticed in certain countries whose 
politics have drifted to the (far) right
8
. Ironically, many of the Arab states who opposed the 
extended use of the term gender during the negotiations will still have to sign up to the ICCS, 
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although it should be made clear that the evidence indicates that this is far from being a 
problem only of Islamic countries. 
 
The study departs from the underlying premise that it is about a particular incident of 
consensus-finding in international law, not about an exploration of the tensions between 
principled, deontological decision-making and definitions of human rights on the one hand, 
and theories of toleration on the other.  It takes the position that in the context of an 
international criminal jurisdiction with a global reach which prides itself on a specific gender 
awareness – as evidenced among other things by the Draft Policy Paper of the ICC’s 
Prosecutor on sexual and gender-based crimes of 7 February 2014
9
 – a toleration-based 
approach leads to unacceptable double standards. The author is aware that such a view is, of 
course, debatable. The paper also only looks at criminalisation as the most glaring example, 
not at other forms of direct or indirect discrimination which do, of course, occur over a much 
wider range of jurisdictions. The data used in this paper about which countries criminalise 
LGBT persons and how were taken from the interactive map of the Human Dignity Trust
10
. 
This revealed that criminalisation as such is not an issue in the USA or the EU. Cross-checks 
with the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association’s website11 
confirmed this picture in that there was either no law criminalising male-to-male or female-
to-female sexual contacts or there were no data. A recent report by the European Union from 
2013 on the increase of negative experiences of LGBT persons within EU Member States 
shows that this is an issue even in the so-called developed industrial countries
12
. It is clear 
that if one included such wider data, the picture would change drastically. However, the 
author believes that the focus on criminalisation as a reasonably distinguishable category of 
serious discrimination is justifiable and that in that context the data selection does not skew 
the overall picture.  
 
We will not look at conflict-related offences under international criminal law, when victims 
are being targeted by militants  based on their sexual orientation, but at the  pervasive 
worldwide practice in a large number of domestic jurisdictions of prosecuting people in 
peace-time for the mere fact of living LGBT  lives – in essence a much bigger scandal. In this 
context, we will also leave aside the somewhat thornier and no less controversial policy issue 
of protecting juveniles in their sexual development where the reason for the sanction is not 
merely the fact of being LGBT but also the concern over the “normal” development of young 
persons – regardless of what the evidence may be for that. Equally, we will not address the 
matter of whether states should allow formalised same-sex unions, i.e. civil partnerships or 
“gay marriage” or adoption. Despite the fact that these may also be considered by the LGBT 
community as unjustified state intrusions into the individuals’ right to privacy and their 
gender identity, there would appear to be a marked difference between not allowing same-sex 
partners the same privileges as heterosexual partners under family law on the one hand, and 
sanctioning them for simply being what they are by imprisonment, corporal punishment or 
even death on the other
13
. We will examine the claim alluded to above whether the existing 
international criminal law does allow for the characterisation of domestic criminalisation as a 
crime against humanity
14
, with or without the invocation of the term gender, and how to take 
the debate forward.   
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Domestic criminalisation of LGBT persons – The scope of the problem 
 
 
Table 1 (see Annex 1) lists the countries which in 2013 still penalise the sexual conduct of 
LGBT persons. Of the total number (83) of states which criminalise LGBT persons, 37 are 
States Parties of the ICC (44.6%) and 46 are not (55.4%). Broken down by regions, the 
relations are as follows: 
 
Table 2.1 
Criminalisation by region and membership of ASP 
 
Region ASP member Non-ASP member 
Latin America & West Pacific 11 (84.6%) 
 
2 (15.4%) 
Africa & Indian Ocean 22 (56.4%) 
 
17 (43.6%) 
Middle East, Asia & East Pacific 4 (12.9%) 
 
27 (87.1%) 
 
 
Table 2.2 
Criminalisation by region, membership of ASP and main religion 
 
Region ASP member Non-ASP member 
Latin America & West Pacific I C O I C O 
- 11 - - 2 - 
Africa & Indian Ocean I C O I C O 
9 14 2 8 6 3 
Middle East, Asia & East Pacific I C O I C O 
1 2 - 20 5 3 
Total 10 27 2 28 13 6 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. These tables are drawn from Table 1. 
2. I = Islam; C = Christianity; O = others, including Buddhism, Hinduism, traditional and natural religions 
3. If the percentage of religions was roughly equal, they all received a point, thus n = 83 does not apply. 
 
These statistics show that the concentration of countries criminalising LGBT per region is the 
highest in Africa, with almost 47% of the entire sample and 59.5% of the States Parties. The 
main religion in the majority of the states criminalising LGBT persons is not Islam but 
Christianity, if only by a small margin. Thus the stereotype sometimes voiced that it is the 
influence of  Shari’a law which makes up for most of the criminalisation seems unfounded; 
Islam roughly equals Christianity in the sample. Indeed, the historical missionary influence of 
the Christian churches will have had a similarly conservative influence in many countries. 
However, the Islamic cultural outlook may have something to do with the fact that in the 
Middle East and Asian region the number of States Parties is almost negligible, despite the 
fact that some North African Islamic countries have now signed up to the Rome Statute
15
. 
The more or less unspoken, lingering religious background in many of the countries is 
linguistically expressed in the reference to acts that are “unnatural”, “against the order of 
nature” (or even “abominable”), with that order historically being mostly deduced from a 
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certain interpretation of their Holy Scriptures. Similarly, the use of the very word “sodomy” 
has roots in the Old Testament referring to the story of the fall of Sodom as a punishment, 
among other things, for the unbridled (homo)sexual excesses of its inhabitants
16
. 
 
The relative severity of punishments in members of the ASP and non-members is set out in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Severity of penalties by maximum and type, and ASP membership 
 
 
Penalty ASP members Non-ASP members 
 
Death 2 
 
9 
Imprisonment for life 6 
 
3 
Imprisonment over 10 yrs. 8 
 
7 
Imprisonment over 5 yrs. 10 
 
9 
Imprisonment under 5 yrs. 10 
 
18 
Corporal punishment 3 
 
6 
Security measures - 
 
3 
Hard labour 3 
 
2 
Mental hospital order 1 
 
1 
Fine 
 
6 9 
Other (banishment, tribal 
sanctions etc.) 
2 2 
 
 
Notes:  
 
1. When jurisdictions allowed for different sanctions for men and women, the harshest overall penalty 
was recorded. 
2. Not all country information was specific on maximum sanctions, so n=83 does not apply for this table. 
 
As far as the death penalty is concerned, all jurisdictions that employ it are Islamic states; it is 
remarkable that even two ASP members still threaten the death penalty, again a consequence 
of their application of Shari’a law. Twice as many ASP members than non-ASP members use 
life imprisonment. The maximum fixed-term imprisonment categories over 10 and between 5 
– 10 years are almost evenly divided between both categories, with a slightly higher use for 
ASP members in both. A striking fact is that the use of imprisonment for fixed terms under 5 
years is much more prevalent in non-ASP members than in ASP jurisdictions: 35.7% versus 
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64.3% of this category. Similarly the use of fines is higher in non-ASP members by a degree 
of 50%. More ASP members use hard labour as a penalty than non-ASP members. The 
relation vis-à-vis corporal punishment is again driven by the fact that most jurisdictions that 
use it are Islamic ones. Overall, however, the picture which emerges is that being a signatory 
to the Rome Statute does not necessarily mean an impact on domestic sentencing attitudes, 
leave alone on general principles of criminalisation. Positive complementarity seems to miss 
a foothold in that respect. 
 
The problem of Art. 7(3) ICCS 
 
 
 
The negotiating history around Art. 7(3) ICCS was based on political comity, not on 
principled reasoning. Obviously, one may say that the perfect is the enemy of the good. 
However, this will be no consolation for the LGBT persons caught in the anomaly caused by 
the restrictive phrasing of the term “gender”. For the 37 States Parties to the ICC who 
criminalise LGBT persons, this drafting outcome was also important to avoid running afoul 
of the complementarity principle should the Prosecutor entertain the idea of looking at the 
persecution of LGBT persons in those countries. Because were it not for Art. 7(3) ICCS that 
is precisely what it would be: persecution as a crime against humanity. As we will see below, 
international law in general is not in principle averse to viewing sexual orientation as a 
gender-related or group-related human rights concept, even though Schabas calls the current 
state of the law “primitive”17 – a characterisation with more than one connotation in this 
context. It needs no elaboration that the enforcement or even mere existence of a state-
sponsored law which allows for the killing, imprisonment and corporal punishment etc. of 
certain groups of people based on their sexual orientation is a systematic attack on a civilian 
population on discriminatory grounds based on a state policy resulting in the commission of 
acts subsumable, for example, under Art. 7(1)(a), (e), (f) and (k) ICCS. However, as long as 
these acts are the consequences of lawful sanctions under domestic law and do not violate 
cogent international law they cannot be offences under the ICCS.  
 
For this very reason it appears unconvincing to assume that the drafters engaged in a 
conspiratorial exercise of “constructive ambiguity”18 with the intention of leaving the door 
open to the ICC judges to interpret a wider meaning into the term gender in Art. 7(3) ICCS, 
namely to include sexual orientation. It cannot have been in the interest of the opposing states 
to allow for such a possibility because the consequences under the complementarity principle 
would have been obvious: As soon as the ICC would have interpreted gender to include 
sexual orientation, all the opposing states in the negotiation phase – and any state signing up 
to the Rome Statute later – with laws criminalising LGBT persons would automatically have 
to be considered unable to conduct their own prosecutions for that potential crime against 
humanity, because the judiciary and law enforcement authorities would merely apply the 
state’s law – a classic case when a state cannot fix the problem on its own short of 
decriminalisation. It is also unlikely that a state would leave any loophole open that might at 
some stage expose it to the allegation of a crime against humanity, which speaks against an 
open-ended formulaic compromise. Note, however, that a number of States Parties do not use 
the definition in Art. 7(3) ICC in their implementing legislation
19
 but seem to rely on the 
simple term gender
20
. 
 
It is much more plausible that the compromise formula in Art. 7(3) ICCS actually meant a 
defeat for the states advocating the inclusion of sexual orientation. Valerie Oosterveld, who 
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had had a contemporary insight into the negotiation process, in a comment to the author
21
 on 
an earlier draft made the following point: 
 
Both those supportive of the term "gender" and those opposed to its use had reasons to ultimately agree 
to ambiguous wording in article 7(3). Those opposed to the inclusion of the term were in the minority, 
and therefore they faced the possibility of losing if 7(3) was put to a vote or left to the final package: 
recall that negotiations on the term "gender" went until almost the very last day of the Diplomatic 
Conference and there was the possibility that the opposing states would have no say on the Chair's 
resolution of all outstanding issues. Thus, it was in their interests to try to seek wording that could be 
ambiguous enough to be read narrowly. Conversely, while those supportive of the term were in the 
majority, they were also from states opposed to voting. Thus, they sought wording that could be 
understood in light of future developments within international law in support of LGBT rights. 
 
That may be so, but the majority states which favoured the novelty of the inclusion of sexual 
orientation would have run the same risk as it may be queried whether the Chair would really 
have taken such a major policy decision which would have seriously alienated the opposing 
states and put them in a quandary under the complementarity principle. The fact that the 
majority states were opposed to voting on the issue is neither here nor there as far as drawing 
consequences for the interpretation of Art. 7(3) ICCS is concerned. At best, one might say 
there was no real consensus at all, a dissent  hidden in the semantically redundant second 
sentence of Art. 7(3) ICCS. It appears highly doubtful against this background that the judges 
should have been empowered to substitute their own policy choice for the intentional 
omission of choice by the States Parties,  merely because a progressive attitude to the 
development of the law is deemed appropriate
22
. Art. 7(3) ICCS uses both words, gender and 
sex – and more to the point the latter to explain the meaning of the former –, and it would 
seem very odd given the controversy’s moral and traditional background that this choice of 
words was a matter of chance.  
 
Nor is this a case which could be compared with open and unspecific language found 
elsewhere in the Rome Statute, for example, as to what exactly the meaning of the elements 
of an offence’s actus reus, mens rea or defences in the ICCS will be: Those are technical 
matters of law and doctrine, not overall policy. The question of sexual orientation, however,  
is eminently a highly sensitive question of overall policy. To leave it to the judges to fill that 
element would in fact mean no less than allowing them to rewrite the negotiation outcome 
and hence the policy content of the Rome Statute. It is hard to imagine that the opposing 
states would have countenanced the prospect of such an interpretation of the negotiations and 
their outcome. In other words, the wording, the context and the history of the negotiations 
around Art. 7(3) ICCS all point in the opposite direction from the one favoured by what we 
could call the “inclusionists”. 
 
Art. 7(3) ICCS therefore in fact possesses a gatekeeper function for the liability of actors in 
the ASP member jurisdictions for all underlying offences. This gatekeeper function against 
the introduction of LGBT references into the term gender, which  according to some was the 
express intention
23
 of the drafters, is a cogent argument against the views of those who 
advocate the use of the residual clause in Art. 7(1)(h) ICCS to bring in sexual orientation 
through the back door. The Rome Statute must be seen as a whole and its drafters must be 
considered as having taken a holistic and informed approach to its creation. It would fly in 
the face of common sense and accepted principles of legal interpretation to suggest that the 
drafters would struggle over the restriction of the very term relevant to the issue and then 
intend to leave it open to the judges to interpret the residual clause in a way that would 
countermand their hard-fought compromise.  
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The only reasonable conclusion must be that Art. 7(3) ICCS is dispositive of the matter and 
leaves no room for the use of the residual clause; this is supported by the general maxim that 
a special law derogates a general law. To allow the judges to substitute their own 
interpretation, either of Art. 7(3) or (1)(h) ICCS, for that of the drafters and the states who 
signed up to the Rome Statute would also run counter in a major fashion to one clear 
underlying policy in the Rome Statute and its secondary laws, which is to curb the excesses 
of judicial discretion which occurred at the ad hoc tribunals when those applied what their 
judges considered to be customary law. The Rome Statute restricts the use of judicial 
discretion compared to the ad hocs. If we take issue with the law of the ICC, it must therefore 
be through a revision of Art. 7(3) ICCS, not a strained re-interpretation that disregards the 
highly controversial debate about the issue. 
 
That does by no means imply that the interplay of Art. 7(3) and (1)(h) ICCS and the 
compromise negotiated by the drafters make sense as the provision stands. Quite the contrary: 
Imagine, for argument’s sake, a political, cultural or religious group which has as one of its 
main tenets of identity-building the encouragement of homo- or bisexual relationships. Its 
adherents who engage in same-sex relations according to its teachings, it can be argued, 
would then be attacked on the basis of belonging to one of the protected groups and for 
exercising their culture, religion or ideology. The restriction in Art. 7(3) ICCS related to the 
term gender would be moot, because it cannot be seen as also restricting the ambit of other 
specifically mentioned protected groups as opposed to the general residual clause. Gender is 
only one of them and does not stand in any hierarchical relationship to them. In fact, 
however, the only reason which would actually trigger the prosecution of these people would 
be their sexual behaviour, not their mere membership of the group, which despite the 
encouragement might leave them the free choice to engage in same-sex relations. Do we 
really need such a farcical argumentative detour to see the problem with the existing law 
from the perspective of principle as opposed to politics?  
 
 
Sexual orientation in international law 
 
 
While  there is no full consensus in the international community about the treatment of sexual 
orientation, particularly when issues such as same-sex partnerships and adoption of children 
by homosexual persons or couples are concerned, the modern trend has for some time clearly 
been in favour of recognising the role and effects of sexual orientation in the context of 
domestic laws which attach any significant legal consequence to it. Only recently the ECtHR 
had the opportunity to address the issue of adoption by same-sex couples in X and Others v 
Austria
24
. The Court reviewed its previous case law towards sexual orientation under the 
ECHR and reiterated: 
 
The Court has dealt with a number of cases concerning discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation in the sphere of private and family life. Some were examined under Article 8 
alone, namely cases concerning the prohibition under criminal law of homosexual relations 
between adults … and the discharge of homosexuals from the armed forces … . Others were 
examined under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. The issues at stake included 
differing ages of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations…, the granting of 
parental rights … , authorisation to adopt a child …, the right to succeed to the deceased 
partner’s tenancy… , the right to social insurance cover … and the question of same-sex 
couples’ access to marriage or to an alternative form of legal recognition … .  
Sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14. The Court has repeatedly held that, just 
like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly 
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serious reasons by way of justification or, as is sometimes said, particularly convincing and 
weighty reasons …. Where a difference of treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the 
State’s margin of appreciation is narrow … . Differences based solely on considerations of 
sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention … .25 
 
Cultural differences or reservations in society alone had already previously been regarded by 
the Court as an insufficient
26
 criterion to base any discriminatory sanctions on. The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1996 took a similar stance to reliance on sexual orientation with 
regard to discrimination
27
, as did the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
28
. In a decision 
of 7 November 2013, the ECJ held in the context of refugee law: 
 
“1. Article 10(1)(d) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards 
for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or Stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
must be interpreted as meaning that the existence of criminal laws, such as those at issue in 
each of the cases in the main proceedings, which specifically target homosexuals, supports the 
finding that those persons must be regarded as forming a particular social group. 
2. Article 9(1) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 9(2)(c) thereof, must be 
interpreted as meaning that the criminalisation of homosexual acts per se does not constitute 
an act of persecution. However, a term of imprisonment which sanctions homosexual acts and 
which is actually applied in the country of origin which adopted such legislation must be 
regarded as being a punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory and thus 
constitutes an act of persecution. 
3. Article 10(1)(d) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 2(c) thereof, must be 
interpreted as meaning that only homosexual acts which are criminal in accordance with the 
national law of the Member States are excluded from its scope. When assessing an application 
for refugee status, the competent authorities cannot reasonably expect, in order to avoid the 
risk of persecution, the applicant for asylum to conceal his homosexuality in his country of 
origin or to exercise reserve in the expression of his sexual orientation”29. 
 
The Court’s view that criminalisation as such was not persecution and only became so once 
prison sentences were involved and actually applied in practice, is highly questionable, 
because it implies that criminalising homosexual behaviour as such is in the realm of the 
legitimate. Yet, for our purposes the recognition of homosexual persons as a social group is 
of particular relevance.  
 
The matter has apparently not been discussed explicitly in the practice of international 
criminal tribunals yet: A court record search of, for example, the ICTY website with the 
search term “sexual orientation” did not deliver any hits. Other international bodies30 have 
expressed similar sentiments. In the landmark case of Toonen v. Australia
31
, the UN Human 
Rights Committee in 1994 held that the term “sex” in Art. 2(1) and Art. 26 ICCPR included 
sexual orientation and that a criminalisation on that basis was a violation of the right to 
privacy under Art. 17(1) ICCPR and of non-discrimination under Art. 2(1) ICCPR. The 
Human Rights Committee has since consistently reiterated its stance of the criminalisation of 
persons based on sexual orientation
32
. The UN Committees against Torture
33
 and on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
34
, as well as the UN Commission on Human 
Rights
35
 have followed suit in this approach, as have the UN Special Rapporteurs on Human 
Rights Defenders, on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression
36
 and on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
37
, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights
38
 and the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights
39
. Domestic case law in a number of countries has also seen a development of either 
inclusive interpretation
40
 or declarations of unconstitutionality coupled in some cases with a 
reading-down of the laws in question to make them compatible with the constitutional 
framework
41
. The German Federal Constitutional Court on 19 February 2013, i.e. the same 
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date as the ECtHR in the decision quoted above, declared a federal law unconstitutional 
which prohibited the successive adoption of the child of one partner to a same-sex partnership 
by the other partner
42
. On 26 June 2013, The United States Supreme Court in the case of US 
v. Windsor et al.
43
 added its own support to the struggle for recognition of marriage equality. 
The Philippines passed a law on international crimes on 2009 which in section 6(h) 
reproduces the wording of Art. 7(1)(h) ICCS but crucially adds “sexual orientation” after 
gender
44. Timor Leste’s Penal Code of 2009 contains a general sentencing provision in Art. 
52(2)(e) which makes it an aggravating factor if the crime was committed based on 
discrimination because of sexual orientation
45
. All of this is of relevance in the context of the 
sources of international law under Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. There is also a growing body 
of literature which draws particularly on the situation in refugee and asylum law
46
. In 2007, 
the International Commission of Jurists adopted the Yogyakarta Principles on the application 
of human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity
47
 which did, 
however, receive a rather cold response
48
 from some members of the UN General Assembly’s 
Third Committee
49
 in the context of a report by the former Special Rapporteur on education, 
Vernor Muñoz. 
 
Finding Orientation 
 
This state of affairs presents a deeply unsatisfactory picture: The international community’s 
legal experts virtually unanimously and strongly advocate ending the use of sexual 
orientation as a trigger to criminal sanctions,  calling it a violation of human rights. It is 
accepted as a ground for refugee and asylum claims. Yet, the states who make up the 
international community still do not speak with one voice in this regard, which can only have 
to do with traditional and/or religious attitudes, and in the case of Islamic countries, with a 
certain interpretation of Shari’a law. Javaid Rehman and Eleni Polymenopoulou have 
recently shown that LGBT rights and Islam can be reconciled to a large extent by a more 
compassionate treatment of the source material
50
.  
 
These traditional views in essence equate to saying that you can take away a person’s liberty, 
physically maltreat or even kill them merely because they have a different sexuality, even if 
no-one was hurt in any meaningful sense of the word. This would appear to be on a par with 
punishing people for engaging in extramarital (hetero)sexual relationships, something which 
a lot of the countries which find the same or similar treatment acceptable for LGBT persons 
would probably condemn as barbaric and outdated. These views are in essence medieval and 
barbaric in the LGBT context and no longer suitable for any developed society in the 21
st
 
century. Koskenniemi once called international law “the gentle civilizer of nations”51. The 
problem with that is that international law is made by states’ consensus and can thus only be 
as civilised as the states that make it. Art. 7(3) ICCS in the interpretation one must currently 
regrettably give it, is evidence of a civilisation deficit in 37 states who nonetheless profess to 
follow the principles laid out in the Preamble to the ICCS, among them the following: 
 
 
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a 
shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time, 
 
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity… 
10 
 
For any LGBT person in those 37 countries, this must sound very hollow, if not downright 
duplicitous. The lack of consensus at the ICC negotiations on this point is an indictment of 
the state of the entire international community, too. The emphasis on gender violence in 
international criminal law in recent years needs to be widened from the current main focal 
point of violence against women to violence because of gender, and gender needs to include 
sexual orientation. Imprisonment, corporal punishment and executions are forms of violence, 
the last two of which should be banned in any context. All penal sanctions for consensual 
same-sex activities between adults are unacceptable in a modern society which claims to be 
governed by the rule of law and the respect for the autonomy of the individual.  
 
Traditions are an important part of the human psyche, both individually and as a community, 
and one should not meddle with them lightly. Some traditions, however, stem from a less 
enlightened era and are based on a less compassionate interpretation of their sources than was 
and is necessary. They need to be seriously revised or abandoned entirely. The treatment of 
LGBT persons under some criminal jurisdictions is one of them. International criminal law – 
especially if it based on a treaty like the ICC Statute and not on customary law – as a 
fledgling creature with high moral ambitions, should not start out with the baggage from a 
bygone time but instead pro-actively aim to be a “civilizer”. Art. 7(3) ICCS in the meaning it 
was meant to have is not civilised. The ASP should repeal it and any reference to it in the 
Rome Statute sooner rather than later. That explicit repeal would then indeed leave it open to 
the judges of the ICC to interpret the remaining word “gender” progressively. 
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Countries which criminalise LGBT persons (for LGBT-specific acts
52
) 
 
Country ASP 
member 
MR Male/Female Offence Penalty 
 
Latin America & West Pacific 
 
Cook Islands Y C M Indecency 
between males; 
sodomy 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5/7 yrs 
Kiribati  
 
N 
 
 
C 
M/F Buggery; attempts 
to commit 
unnatural offences 
and indecent 
assaults; gross 
indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/7/5 
yrs 
Belize  
Y 
 
C 
M/F Having carnal 
intercourse 
against the order 
of nature with any 
person 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs 
Jamaica  
N 
 
C 
M Buggery; 
attempted 
buggery; gross 
indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10/7/2 
yrs; all with or 
without hard 
labour 
St. Kitts and Nevis  
Y 
 
 
C 
M Buggery Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs; 
with or without 
hard labour 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
 
Y 
 
C 
M/F Buggery; serious  
indecency; 
specific 
homosexual acts 
(“unnatural” or 
“abominable”) 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 
15/5/10/4 yrs.;  in 
part with or 
without hard 
labour 
St. Lucia Y C M/(F ) Buggery; gross 
indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
Dominica  
Y 
 
C 
M/F Buggery; gross 
indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10/5 
yrs; optional 
mental hospital 
order 
Barbados  
Y 
 
 
C 
M/F Buggery; indecent 
assault; serious 
indecency 
Imprisonment for 
life or not 
exceeding 5/10 
yrs. 
Grenada Y C M Unnatural crimes Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Y C 
 
M/F Buggery; gross 
indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10/5 
yrs. 
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Trinidad & Tobago Y C M/F Buggery; serious 
indecency  
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 25/5 
yrs. 
Guyana  
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
M 
Acts of serious 
indecency with 
male persons; 
attempt to commit 
unnatural 
offences; buggery 
 
 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2/10 
yrs./for life 
 
Africa & Indian Ocean 
 
Senegal  
Y 
 
I 
M/F 
 
 
Unnatural sexual 
acts  
 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 years/ 
fine not exceeding 
1,500,000 F. 
Mauritania  
N 
 
I 
M/F Acts against 
nature 
M: death by public 
stoning; F: 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 yrs. 
Morocco  
N 
 
I 
M/F Lewd and 
unnatural acts 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
1,000 DHS. 
The Gambia Y I M/F Unnatural 
offences 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14 yrs. 
Guinea  
Y 
 
I 
M/F Indecent acts; acts 
against nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
1,000,000 F. 
Sierra Leone Y I M Buggery Imprisonment for 
life. 
Liberia Y C M/F Sodomy Imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr. 
Ghana Y C M Unnatural carnal 
knowledge 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 25 yrs. 
Togo  
N 
 
N 
(Strong C 
and I 
minorities) 
M/F Crimes against 
nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
500,000 F. 
Benin  
Y 
 
C (= 42%) 
(I = 28%) 
(N = 23%) 
M/F Indecent acts; acts 
against the order 
of nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
500,000 F. 
Nigeria  
 
 
Y 
 
C/I = 
50/50% 
 
North = I 
M/F Carnal knowledge 
against the order 
of nature/attempt; 
gross indecency 
Federal Code: 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/7/3 
yrs. 
Maximum under 
Shari’a law in 
Northern states: M: 
death; F: lashes 
and/or 
imprisonment 
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Cameroon  
N 
 
C 
M/F Unnatural 
offences 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
200,000 F. 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
 
N 
 
C 
M/F Acts against the 
order of nature 
Security/education 
measures; e.g. 
labour camp 
 
Angola  
N 
 
C 
M/F Acts against the 
order of nature 
Security/education 
measures; e.g. 
labour camp 
Namibia Y 
 
C M Sodomy Unclear  
Lesotho  
Y 
C M Sodomy  Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
Botswana  
Y 
C/N = 
50/50% 
M/F Unnatural 
offences/attempt; 
indecent practices 
between persons 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 7/5 yrs. 
Swaziland  
N 
 
C 
M Sodomy  Imprisonment; fine 
– both unclear; 
eviction from home 
under tribal law 
Zimbabwe  
N 
 
C 
M Indecent  acts Imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr.; 
fine of 5,000 USD 
(may be exceeded) 
Mozambique  
 
N 
 
 
 
 
N (= 47%) 
(C = 35%) 
(I = 18%) 
M/F Acts against the 
order of nature; 
vices against 
nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
security measures 
for habitual 
offenders:  hard 
labour, internment 
in asylum, ban 
from exercising 
profession 
Zambia  
Y 
 
 
C (= 50%) 
(N < 49%) 
M/F Sodomy/attempt; 
gross indecency 
Imprisonment for 
life/not exceeding 
14/14  yrs. 
Malawi  
Y 
 
C 
M/F Unnatural 
offences; indecent 
practices 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14 yrs 
with or without 
corporal 
punishment/5 yrs. 
Tanzania/Zanzibar  
 
Y 
 
 
Tanzania: 
 
C/I = 30-
40/30-40% 
 
Zanzibar: 
 
I  
M/F Unnatural 
offences/attempt; 
gross indencency 
Tanzania: 
Imprisonment of 
no less than 30 yrs. 
to life/not 
exceeding 20 
yrs./5 yrs.; fine not 
exceeding 300,000 
Shilling 
 
Zanzibar: 
M: Imprisonment 
not exceeding 25 
yrs. 
F: Imprisonment 
not exceeding 7 rs. 
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Burundi  
Y 
 
C 
M/F Same-sex 
relations 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
100,000 F 
 
Kenya  
Y 
 
C 
M/F Carnal knowledge 
against the order 
of nature; 
indecent acts 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/5 
yrs. 
Uganda  
 
Y 
 
 
C 
M/F Carnal knowledge 
against the order 
of nature; attempt 
to commit 
indecent acts; 
gross indecency 
Imprisonment for 
life/not exceeding 
7/7 yrs. 
Somalia  
N 
 
 
I 
M/F Carnal same-sex 
intercourse 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
in Southern parts 
under Shari’a law: 
death 
Ethiopia  
 
 
N 
C 
(proportion 
I unclear) 
M/F Homosexual acts; 
other unnatural 
acts 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs./5 
yrs. for repeat 
offences/15 yrs. if 
known venereal 
disease 
transmitted, if acts 
of ‘sadism’, or  if 
other party 
subsequently 
commits suicide 
owing to ‘distress, 
shame or despair’. 
South Sudan  
N 
 
N 
M/F Carnal intercourse 
against the order 
of nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs.; 
fine 
Sudan  
 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
 
I 
M/F Sodomy; gross 
indecency 
Sodomy: 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 
yrs./100 lashes; 3
rd
 
offence: death/life 
imprisonment; 
Indecency: 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr./40 
lashes 
Eritrea N I M/F Same-sex sexual 
acts; unnatural 
acts 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs. 
Egypt  
 
N 
 
 
I 
M/F (unclear – 
only men 
prosecuted so 
far) 
Debauchery and 
prostitution; 
contempt for 
religion; 
shameless public 
acts 
 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
300 EgP 
Libya  
N 
 
I 
M/F Sexual intercourse 
and lewd acts 
outside marriage 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 yrs. 
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Tunisia Y 
 
I M/F Sodomy  Imprisonment not 
exceeding  3 yrs. 
Algeria  
N 
 
I 
M/F Homosexual acts Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
2,000 Dinar 
 
Comoros  
Y 
 
I 
M/F Unnatural acts Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 yrs.; 
fine not exceeding 
1,000,000 F 
Maldives  
 
Y 
 
 
I 
M/F Uncodified 
Shari’a law on 
homosexual acts 
Banishment not 
exceeding 1 yr; 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs.; 
39 lashes. 
Seychelles Y C M Unnatural acts Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14 yrs. 
Mauritius Y 
 
H (=50%) 
(C = 
32.5%) 
 
(I = 17 %) 
M Sodomy  Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 yrs. 
 
Middle East, Asia and East Pacific 
 
Yemen   
 
 
N 
 
 
 
I 
M/F Anal intercourse 
between men; 
sexual stimulation 
between women  
Death by stoning 
for married men; 
100 lashes and 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr. for 
unmarried men; 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs. 
for women 
Saudi Arabia  
 
N 
 
 
I 
M/F Sodomy; sexual 
relationships 
outside marriage 
under Shari’a law 
Death by stoning 
for married men; 
100 
lashes/banishment 
not exceeding 1 yr. 
for unmarried 
men; women 
unclear 
Oman N I M/F Sexual same-sex 
acts 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs. 
UAE  
 
N 
 
 
I 
M/F Sexual acts 
outside marriage 
under Shari’a law 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
(Dubai)/14 yrs. 
(Abu Dhabi/ death  
under Shari’a law 
(unclear) 
Qatar  
 
 
N 
 
 
 
I 
M/F Sexual acts 
outside marriage 
under Shari’a law 
(Muslims only); 
same-sex sexual 
acts 
Penal Code: 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 7 yrs.;  
Shari’a law: 
flogging for 
unmarried persons; 
death for married 
persons (adultery) 
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Kuwait  
N 
 
I 
M Consensual 
intercourse 
between men 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 7 years 
Iraq  
N 
 
I 
unclear Unclear – no 
penal code law, 
but instances of 
Shari’a court 
convictions 
Death  
Syria N I M/F Unnatural sexual 
intercourse  
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs. 
Gaza N I M Sexual acts 
between´men 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
Lebanon N I M/F Sexual intercourse 
against nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr. 
(Turkish Republic 
of Northern 
Cyprus – only 
recognised by 
Turkey) 
 
N 
 
I 
M  Sexual intercourse 
against the order 
of nature/attempt 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5/3 yrs. 
Iran   
 
 
N 
 
 
 
I 
M/F Sodomy; ‘Tafhiz’ 
(the rubbing of 
the thighs or 
buttocks between 
two men); two 
men being naked 
under one cover; 
two men kissing 
‘with lust’; 
lesbianism; two 
women not 
related by blood 
being naked under 
one cover. 
Sodomy: death; 
Tafhiz: 100 lashes/ 
death on 4
th
 
offence; 
Lesbianism: 100 
lashes/death on 4
th
 
offence 
Turkmenistan N I M Sodomy  Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 yrs. 
Uzbeskistan N I M Consensual male 
intercourse 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 yrs. 
Pakistan  
 
N 
 
 
I 
M Unnatural 
offences 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs.; 
sodomy under 
Hudood 
Ordinance: death 
by stoning/ 
imprisonment for 
life 
Afghanistan  
 
Y 
 
 
I 
M/F Adultery and 
pederasty 
(‘pederasty’ = 
sexual relations 
between males of 
any age) 
 
Penal Code: long-
term 
imprisonment; 
Sharia law: 
maximum sentence 
of death. 
India (State of 
Jammu & 
Kashmir) 
N I M Unnatural 
offences 
Imprisoment for 
life 
Bhutan  
N 
 
 
B 
M/F Sodomy; sexual 
conduct against 
the order of nature 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 yr. 
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Bangladesh  
Y 
 
I 
M Voluntary carnal 
intercourse 
against the order 
of nature 
Imprisonment for 
life/not exceeding 
10 yrs./fine. 
Myanmar  
 
N 
 
 
B 
M/F Carnal intercourse 
against the order 
of nature 
Detention in 
isolated penal 
colony for 
life/imprisonment 
not exceeding 10 
yrs./fine. 
Indonesia (South 
Sumatra and Aceh) 
 
N 
 
I 
M/F Sexual acts 
outside marriage 
under Shari’a law 
Imprisonment for 
life 
 
 
Malaysia   
 
N 
 
 
I 
M/F Carnal intercourse 
against the order 
of nature; 
outrages on 
decency; 
Muslims: also 
Shari’a law 
Penal Code: 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 20/2 
yrs; lashes 
Singapore N 
 
B M Outrages on 
decency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 yrs. 
Brunei  
N 
 
I 
M Unnatural 
offences 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 
yrs./fine 
Palau N C M Unnatural same-
sex relations 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs. 
Papua New Guinea  
N 
C M Unnatural 
offences/attempt; 
indecent practices 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/7/3 
yrs. 
Solomon Islands  
N 
C M/F Buggery/attempt; 
gross indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/7/5 
yrs. 
Nauru  
Y 
 
C 
M Unnatural 
offences/attempt; 
indecent practices 
Imprisonment with 
hard labour not 
exceeding 14/7/3 
yrs. 
Tuvalu  
N 
 
C 
M  Buggery/attempt; 
gross indecency 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 14/7/5 
yrs. 
Samoa Y C M  Sodomy; 
indecency 
between males 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 yrs. 
Tonga  
N 
 
C 
M Sodomy/attempt; 
indecent assault 
on a male 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 yrs.; 
with or without 
lashes 
 
 
Note:  
 
1. The data in this table were collected from the interactive map on the website of the Human Dignity 
Trust, from the list of States Parties on the website of the International Criminal Court and from 
individual online country reports in April 2013. The list does not pretend to be exhaustive and could 
not take into account changes after April 2013. 
2. MR = main religion; I = Islam; C = Christianity; B= Buddhism; H = Hinduism; N = traditional and 
natural religions. 
3. The exact offence descriptions and penalty ranges were in a very few cases difficult to verify from the 
web, either in their entirety or partially; these entries have been put into italics. 
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4. Some of the laws in individual countries have been read down by courts to cover only non-consensual 
acts and are thus in effect rape and assault laws, yet they remain on the statute book in their original 
form and thus open to judicial re-interpretation. 
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